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Harm Means Harm:
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon
I. INTRODUCTION
Somewhere deep in the forests of Oregon, the red-cockaded wood-
pecker and the northern spotted owl are nesting in the precious trees
that are their home. Thousands of miles away, in this country's highest
court, a long and fierce battle with these two species at its heart seem-
ingly has come to an end.' Loggers who wished to clear-cut timber
where these rare birds live ran full force into some of the strongest
federal legislation ever passed, the Endangered Species Act (ESA).2
Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 as a means of protecting animals
that were on the brink of extinction,3 or perilously close to that brink."
While ESA protects species, a primary goal is also to protect the habi-
tat,' for the destruction of habitat has been the most critical factor in
species loss.6 In a strong show of support for the ESA as it was enact-
ed and has been interpreted, the Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon7 upheld the Secre-
tary of the Interior's definition of "harm,"8 a term not specifically de-
1. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct.
2407 (1995).
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
3. See id. § 1533(a)(2)(A)(i).
4. See id. § 1533(a)(2)(A)(ii).
5. See id. § 1531(b).
6. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (citing S. REP. No. 307,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2889, 2990). See general-
ly Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under
the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L 155 (1995) (noting the im-
portant relationship between survival of endangered species and maintenance of criti-
cal habitat).
7. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
S. Id. at 2416. The Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, through the Director
of the Fish and Wildlife Service, promulgated the following definition: "Harm in the
definition of 'take' in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.
Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, includ-
ing breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
fined in the Act, thus prohibiting any significant modification or deg-
radation of habitat occupied by endangered species.9
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the status of ESA in light of
the recent Supreme Court decision and to explore the impact the deci-
sion will have both in the courts and in Congress. Part II of this Note
focuses on the historical background of ESA and the relevant court
decisions leading up to Sweet Home.'" Part III summarizes the facts
and procedural history of the case." Part IV closely examines the ma-
jority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Sweet Home.'2 Part V ex-
plores the implications of the Supreme Court's decision and the possi-
ble ramifications as Congress prepares to reauthorize the ESA. 3 Part
VI concludes by recognizing the importance of biological diversity and
the need for habitat protection as currently embodied in the Endan-
gered Species Act."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act defines an endangered species as
"any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range."'" The Act provides that "it is unlawful for
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to... take
any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the
United States."" "Take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in
any such conduct."'" While there is no definition of "harm" in the Act,
the Secretary of the Interior in 1981 put forth the following regulation
defining the term: "Harm in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an
act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include signifi-
cant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or in-
jures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."8
9. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2409-18.
10. See infra notes 15-77 and accompanying text.
11. See inf notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 86-186 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 187-207 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994).
16. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
17. Id. § 1532(19).
18. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
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The most significant provisions of the Act are contained in section 2,
which defines the goals of the Act; 9 section 5, which authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire land that is, or may become, a criti-
cal habitat for a listed species; 2' section 7, known as "the jeopardy pro-
vision," which requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary
prior to taking state action and proscribes any government agency ac-
tion that will jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their habi-
tat;2 and section 9, which prohibits companies, individuals, and gov-
ernment agencies from "taking" any listed species.22
As written, the Act is an uncompromising piece of legislation. The
Supreme Court signaled that its interpretation of the Act would be just
as unyielding in the landmark case Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
(TVA). 3
B. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
In TVA, construction of the Tellico Dam had essentially been com-
pleted, with the aid of more than $100 million in funds appropriated by
Congress, when a new and endangered breed of perch known as the
snail darter was discovered in the waters of the Little Tennessee Riv-
er.' Environmental groups sought a permanent injunction under the
Endangered Species Act, but were denied at the district court level.25
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994). Noting the decline in species due to economic growth
and development, the Act's purpose is to conserve those species facing extinction and
the ecosystems which are vital to their survival. Id. See generally David P.
Berschauer, Is the "Endangered Species Act" Endangered?, 21 Sw. U. L REV. 991
(1992) (discussing the goals behind the Act).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994).
21. Id. § 1536. See generally Eric Pearson & J. David Aiken, Protecting Public
Values in the Platte River, 20 CREIGHTON L REV. 361 (1986) (analyzing the jeopardy
provision).
22. 16 U.S.C. 1538 (1994). See generally Oliver A. Houck, Endangered Species Act
and its Implementation by the U.S. Department of Interior and Commerce, 64 U.
COLO. L REv. 277 (1993) (providing an in-depth examination of ESA and highlighting
the "taking" prohibition).
23. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
24. Id. at 157-59.
25. Id. at 165-66; see Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Prior to this
action, completion of the dam had been tied up from 1972 until late 1973 with an
injunction for violations of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. See Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.),
offd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding a prima
facie violation of the jeopardy provision because TVA's actions would
clearly jeopardize both the snail darter and its habitat.26 In order to
review the court of appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.
2 7
Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, which af-
firmed in a six-to-three decision.' Addressing the issue of whether the
Tellico Dam Project would jeopardize the endangered snail darter and
its critical habitat, the Court concluded that the plain meaning of the
text of the Act mandated halting the project.' Examining the legis-
lative history accompanying the Act, the Court determined that "Con-
gress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priori-
ties," thus supporting the Court's holding.' Noting the clear intention
of Congress to reverse the trend of species loss, the majority stressed
the high regard that Congress had for biodiversity, recognizing that
"Congress viewed the value of endangered species as 'incalculable.'"'
In light of the determination that the Tellico Dam Project would vio-
late the Endangered Species Act, the Court rejected the argument that
because an injunction was sought the Court should exercise its equita-
ble discretion in favor of TVA.32 Instead the Court upheld its duty to
enforce the Act" and affirmed the court of appeals' decision.'
26. Hi//, 549 F.2d at 1070.
27. 434 U.S. 954 (1977).
28. TVA, 437 U.S. at 155. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion in which Jus-
tice Blackmun joined. Id. at 195-210 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also
wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 211-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 172-74. Chief Justice Burger noted the irony of its finding in light of
"the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums of public money for the
project, even after congressional Appropriations Committees were apprised of its
apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter." Id. at 172; see also id. at 157-
71 (documenting numerous times Congress and the President authorized funding for
the project in spite of the litigious battles being waged); infra notes 200-01 and ac-
companying text (discussing subsequent legislation passed after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in TVA to authorize operation of the dam).
30. TVA, 437 U.S. at 174.
31. Id. at 187.
32. Id. at 195-96.
33. Id. at 193-94 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.")).
34. Id. at 195. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented, arguing that
the statute and its accompanying legislative history could be interpreted to reach a
result which contained a "modicum of common sense." Id. at 196 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Rehnquist based his dissent on his belief that the Court should have ad-
dressed whether the district court abused its discretion in granting an injunction, and
finding no such abuse, Justice Rehnquist would have reversed the court of appeals.
Id. at 211-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Because TVA was brought under section 7 of ESA, destruction or
adverse modification of critical habitat of the endangered snail darter
was clearly prohibited.' Alteration or loss of critical habitat, however,
is not expressly prohibited in section 9 of the Act.' The issue thus
arose whether a "taking" as prohibited by section 9 includes harm in
the form of habitat degradation or loss. Relying on the strong support
the Supreme Court gave ESA in TVA, the Ninth Circuit first decided the
issue in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources
(Paila 1).37
C. Palfla I
In Pa/la I, the defendants, Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources, were maintaining herds of feral sheep and feral goats that
were destroying habitat critical to the endangered Pala bird.' Envi-
ronmental groups brought suit on behalf of the Palfla after the defen-
dants adopted a plan that allowed the sheep and goats to remain in the
mamane-naio forest and provided for a fencing in of only one-fourth of
the forest to prevent habitat destruction.' The district court granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, ordering the complete removal
of the game animals from the forest.' The defendants appealed on the
grounds that certain disputed material facts made summary judgment
inappropriate, and the defendants' actions should not have been ruled a
"taking."41
In addressing the issue of dispute as to material facts, Judge Skopil
summarily noted that "[tihe only facts material to this case are those
relating to the questions whether the Pahila is an endangered species
and, if so, whether the defendants' actions amounted to a taking."
4 2
The court responded to the first issue by determining the Palila was
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
36. See id. § 1538.
37. 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. Id. at 496. For a discussion of the damage to the mamane forest, its effect on
the Palila, and deforestation in general, see A. Kent MacDougall, Damage Can Be
Irreversible; Drought, Floods, Erosion Add to Impact of Tree Loss; Series: The Van-
ishing Forests, LA. TImEs, June 19, 1987, at 1.
39. Patila 1, 639 F.2d at 496. The plan was adopted despite recommendations by
members of the Board that the feral animals be entirely removed. Id,
40. Id. at 496-97.
41. Id. at 496.
42. Id. at 497.
still endangered.' As for the "takings" issue, the defendants failed to
put forth any of their own evidence on the survivability of the Palla
either outside the forest or in the same forest once it was rehabilitat-
ed.44 Without any facts of their own to dispute the plaintiffs' conten-
tions, defendants' opposition to the motion had to fail for a lack of a
"genuine factual issue."'
The court then addressed whether the defendants' actions constituted
a "taking" pursuant to the Act.4 At that time, the statutory construc-
tion of "taking" included any harassment or harm.4' Harm was inter-
preted as "activity that results in significant environmental modification
or degradation of the endangered animal's habitat."4 Noting the defer-
ential treatment accorded to listed species,"' the Ninth Circuit con-
strued the requirement of "some prohibited impact on an endangered
species" under the Act to constitute an infraction.' The court deter-
mined that the defendants failed to rebut the evidence offered by the
plaintiffs indicating that only a complete removal of the goats and
sheep would protect the Palila from further harm.5' Thus, the court
concluded that to allow the feral animals to remain would result in a
continued "taking" of the endangered Palla, and the Ninth Circuit ac-
cordingly affirmed the injunction.52
Despite the Ninth Circuit's holding, the plight of the Palila remained
unsure. In 1981, the Secretary redefined the term harm,' and Pa/ila v.
43. Id. Judge Skopil discounted any reference to recent changes in the bird's exis-
tence as "immaterial." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(c) (1981)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1979)).
50. Id. (citing Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), affd in part and
vacated in part, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981)).
51. Id. at 498.
52. Id.
53. Harm was originally defined by the Secretary as follows:
"'Harm' in the definition of 'take' in the Act means an act or omission which
actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an
extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include,
but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmen-
tal modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the
meaning of 'harm.'"
649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Haw. 1986) (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1981)). The defini-
tion of harm was rewritten in 1981 by the Secretary to read as follows: "'Harm' in the
definition of 'take' . . . means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act
may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or in-
jures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
[VoL 24: 695, 1997] Sweet Home
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Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources (Paula II)' en-
sued.
D. Palla ll
The Ninth Circuit revisited the endangered Palila in 1984 when envi-
ronmental groups amended the complaint from Patila I to include re-
quiring the removal of mouflon sheep from the mamane forests, and the
defendants argued the Secretary's new definition of harm was given too
sweeping an interpretation by the district court.' The mouflon sheep,
imported by the defendants Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources for the purpose of hunting, depend on the mamane trees as
their food source.' As a result, they posed a direct threat to the sur-
vival of the Paula 6 7 The district court, in siding with the plaintiffs, de-
termined that under the new definition of harm, which included impair-
ment of feeding grounds, the Palila was being harmed in two distinct
ways by the mouflon sheep.' First, the mouflon sheep's consumption
of the Palila's habitat could result in sufficient degradation of the forest
to cause extinction.' Second, the reliance of the mouflon sheep on the
mamane trees for sustenance would inhibit regeneration of the forest,
depriving the Palila of an increased habitat which could foster a come-
back of the bird sufficient to erase its endangered status.'
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the defendants' argument that the
district court's interpretation of harm was overbroad.6 Writing for the
majority, Judge O'Scannlain rejected the defendants' contention that
harm had to be the "actual" destruction62 of the pods of the mamane
tree upon which the Palila depends for its diet,' rather than the "po-
tential" harm that degradation of the mamane forest would bring the
Palila beyond the brink of extinction.' Noting the Secretary's revision
feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1981).
54. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
55. Id at 1107.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id, at 1107-08.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1108.
63. Id. at 1107 n.2.
64. Id. at 1108.
of harm to include hindrance of "essential behavior patterns via habitat
modification,"' the majority concluded that the potential for the Paila
to be wiped out of existence by depletion of the mamane trees was the
type of harm the Secretary intended to preclude.' The majority also
relied upon legislative history to support its decision, significantly not-
ing that if bird-watching could be interpreted as a "taking" in the form
of harassment, then the more direct impact of "mouflon sheep pre-
venting any mamane from growing to maturity" should constitute a
"taking" in the form of harm.67
The Ninth Circuit then considered the defendants' two-pronged argu-
ment that no "taking" had occurred.' First, the defendants argued that
a small herd of the mouflon sheep could coexist with the Palla without
harming the endangered bird.'9 Second, the defendants argued that the
floundering Pala population was a result of the lingering effects of
feral sheep and goats, which had only recently been eradicated, rather
than any harm caused by the mouflon sheep.7" Regarding the
defendants' first point, the court rejected the evidence put forth by the
defendants showing that regeneration of the mamane forest would be
sufficient to support both the mouflon sheep and the Palila. Instead,
the court accepted the testimony offered by the plaintiffs, that the
Palila's survival depended on the habitat that the mouflon would neces-
sarily destroy in their own existence. Therefore, the court concluded
that the lower court's decision was not clearly erroneous.' As for the
defendants' second contention, the court accepted as reasonable
plaintiffs' testimony that "noticeable regeneration ha[d] occurred only
where the feral animals ha[d] been removed and no mouflon sheep
ha[d] appeared," noting an absence of any contradictory evidence prof-
65. Id.; see supra note 53 (defining "harm").
66. Palita II, 852 F.2d at 1108.
67. Id. at 1108-09. The majority referred to a House Report suggesting that the
Secretary could regulate bird-watching activities as a harassment if the presence of
the audubons would inhibit the birds in their essential behavioral patterns. Id.; see
H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
68. Palla II, 852 F.2d at 1109.
69. Id.
.70. Id.
71. Id. The plaintiffs countered defendants' contention that the forest would regen-
erate without the feral sheep and goats by emphasizing that during the early stages
of regeneration the sheep could eat the precious seedlings and prevent them from
reaching maturity. Id. The plaintiffs rejected defendants' proposed alternative plans
for regeneration as ineffective. Id. The defendants' contention that the department
could control the mouflon sheep so as to prevent the mamane trees from deteriorat-
ing was not accepted by plaintiffs. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs disproved the defendants'
claims that the Pallia was recovering, noting that over the long term the population
had remained constant. Id.
72. Id. at 1109-10.
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fered by the defendants on this point.73 The Ninth Circuit therefore af-
firmed the lower court's decision, upholding defendants' allowing
mouflon sheep in to the mamane woodlands as "a 'taking' of the Palila's
habitat."7 4
E. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt
Not long after the Ninth Circuit upheld the Secretary's interpretation
of harm in Palila II, loggers and landowners in Oregon sued the Secre-
tary of the Interior, arguing that the Secretary's definition of harm that
considered habitat modification a "taking" caused them economic injury
by preventing them from clear-cutting their own land.75 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found the Secretary's regulation to
be impermissible,6 thereby conflicting with the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ings in the Paila cases.' The Circuits, now split, thus paved the way
for Sweet Home.
IIL. SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore-
gon,7 the respondents, comprised of various persons and organiza-
tions associated with the logging industry in the Pacific Northwest and
the Southeast," brought a facial challenge to the Secretary's regulation
defining "harm." ' As defined, the regulation prohibited logging in the
region due to the presence of the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endan-
73. Id. at 1110.
74. Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to consider defendants' third ground for appeal,
that harm should not be interpreted to encompass destruction of habitat which hin-
ders an endangered species' recovery, noting that harm resulting from the destruction
of the mamane woodlands that could lead to the extinction of the Palila was suffi-
cient grounds for sustaining the lower court's order to relocate the mouflon sheep.
Id
75. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 806 F. Supp.
279 (1992), rev'd, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rv'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
76. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1472.
77. See supra notes 38-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Pa/i/a cases).
78. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
79. Id at 2410. The principal parties to the action included small landowners and
families whose livelihood depend upon the logging industry, as well as logging com-
panies. Id.
80. Id. The respondents took issue with the Secretary's inclusion of "habitat modi-
fication and degradation" in the definition of harm. Id.
gered species, and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species."
Respondents contended that, as applied, the Secretary's definition of
harm had caused them economic hardship.
s2
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the regulation was valid as applied.' On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia originally affirmed the opinion, but
subsequently affirmed in part and reversed in part on petition for
rehearing.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the split that developed in the circuits regarding whether the
Secretary's interpretation of harm was reasonable.'
IV. MAJORITY, CONCURRING, AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Stevens
In a six-to-three decision written by Justice Stevens,' the Court de-
termined that habitat modification was reasonably included in the
Secretary's definition of harm.87 In announcing the Court's decision,
Justice Stevens first focused on the structure of the ESA, delineating
the Act's prohibition of a "taking" of any listed species, endangered or
threatened,' the Act's definition of "take,"' and the Secretary's inter-
pretation of "harm."'
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2411.
84. Id. The reversal was grounded on application of the canon of statutory con-
struction noscitur a sociis, whereby a word is interpreted in the context of its neigh-
boring words. Id. (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1878)). The court of
appeals deemed that "harm" should only apply to actions where "the perpetrator's
direct application of force [is] against the animal." Id. The court also cited United
States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d 1278, 1282 (1993), which counseled a narrow interpretation
of "harass" in the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A) (1988),
and ESA's legislative history to support its position that harm should not be extended
to include habitat modification. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2411.
85. 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
86. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2409. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined in Justice Stevens's opinion. Justice O'Connor filed a separate con-
curring opinion. Id. at 2418-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see i7,fra notes 131-46 and
accompanying text (discussing the concurrence). Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opin-
ion that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id. at 2421-31
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 147-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the
dissenting opinion).
87. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2412.
88. Id. at 2409.
89. Id. at 2409-10; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
90. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410; see supra notes 8, 53 and accompanying text
(stating the Secretary's definition). Justice Stevens also noted Congress's 1982
[Vol. 24: 695, 1997] Sweet Home
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After a brief recitation of the facts,9 Justice Stevens addressed the
procedural history of the case92 before making two important assump-
tions:9 3 first, that any loss of the spotted owl or red-cockaded
woodpecker would be incurred as incident to the logging rather than
the result of any ill will respondents bore toward the endangered spe-
cies;' and second, that resumption of the logging activities would nec-
essarily result in degradation of critical habitat and thus loss of spe-
cies. 5
In the Court's first line of analysis, under application of the two-
prong Chevron test,' Justice Stevens looked to the text of the ESA to
provide three reasons for finding the Secretary's definition reason-
able.' First, taken in context with the Act, the term harm "naturally
amendment to § 10(a)(1)(B), which restricts the takings proscribed under § 9 by
allowing the Secretary "to grant a permit for any taking otherwise prohibited by
§ 9(a)(1)(B) 'if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out
of an otherwise lawful activity.'" Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410 (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994)). Other safeguards afforded endangered species were observed
by the Court, including § 4, which requires the Secretary to identify those species
bordering on extinction and to periodically update lists of endangered and threatened
species; § 5, which allows the Secretary to purchase lands on which survival of an
endangered or threatened species depends; and § Ts jeopardy provision, which pro-
hibits any federal action that, after consultation with the Secretary, would be likely
to further endanger a listed species or to have a negative impact on habitat critical
to such species' survival. Id.
91. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410; see supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
92. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2410-12; see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text (delineating the procedural history).
93. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412. Due to the motions for summary judgment
that brought the case before the bench, the posture of the case necessitated "certain
factual assumptions" in order to proceed to a decision. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Justice Stevens rejected respondents' contention that the Secretary was re-
stricted to protecting the critical habitat from adverse modification by means of a
§ 5 purchase only, and instead agreed with the Secretary's submission that, under the
harm provision, respondents have a "duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will
cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to § 10" Id.
96. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (establishing a two-prong system of judicial review to determine if agency
interpretations are permissible). Under Chevron, the first prong of the test is to deter-
mine whether the intent of Congress is clear, and if it is, then the court should fol-
low it. Id. at 842-43. If the intent of Congress is absent or ambiguous, applying the
second prong of the test, the court should then determine whether the agency's inter-
pretation is reasonable. Id. at 843. If the interpretation is deemed to be reasonable,
then it should be followed. Id. at 843-44.
97. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2409.
encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death
to members of an endangered or threatened species."' Justice Stevens
rejected respondents' contention that harm should pertain only to "di-
rect applications of force against protected species,"' relying upon the
normal meaning ascribed to harm, which by definition does not require
"direct or willful action.""° As an additional rationale for this position,
Justice Stevens indicated that the interpretation of harm as urged by
the respondents would give the word no independent meaning with
respect to terms used to define "take" in the applicable section.0 '
Thus, a "reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage support[ed]
the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation. " "°
Second, Justice Stevens stated that in light of the "broad purpose" of
the Act, the Secretary's interpretation of harm to include habitat modifi-
cation was consistent with Congress's intent."° Noting that protection
of habitat to encourage conservation of listed species was at the heart
of the Act,"° Justice Stevens looked to the Court's opinion in Tennes-
see Valley Authority v. Hill ° to demonstrate the deference the Court
gave to "the importance of the statutory policy.""° In TVA, the Court
refused to allow the completion of a dam in light of the section 9 prohi-
bition on "takings," finding that such habitat modification would result
in harm to the endangered snail darter."7 Based upon the Court's de-
cision in TVA and Congress's clear intent to protect both ecosystems
and endangered or threatened species, Justice Stevens found the
Secretary's interpretation of harm acceptable.I 8
98. Id. at 2412-13. Justice Stevens pointed out that the definition of harm means
"to cause hurt or damage to: injure." Id. at 2412 (quoting WEBSTER'S TwIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY 1034 (1966)).
99. Id. at 2413.
100. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1034 (1966)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Mackay v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837
& n.11 (1988)). Justice Stevens noted that the other terms in §-3 such as "'harass,'
'pursue,' 'hunt,' 'shoot,' 'wound,' 'kill,' trap,' 'capture,' and 'collect" were not
duplicative because they referred to direct applications of force, while "harm," in
contrast, could result from indirect means such as destruction of critical habitat Id.
at 2413 n.11.
103. Id. at 2413.
104. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
105. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that building of dam was prohibited by ESA, de-
spite $100 million spent by Congress on the nearly completed project, in order to
protect the endangered snail darter which lived in the waters); see also supru notes
24-34 and accompanying text (analyzing the TVA decision).
106. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2413.
107. TVA, 437 U.S. at 184 n.30; see also supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text
(discussing TVA).
108. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2413-14. Justice Stevens dismissed the respondents'
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In his third argument based upon the text of ESA, Justice Stevens
looked to 1982 amendments to the Act, which allowed permits for inci-
dental takings, as an indication that harm was intended to include indi-
rect takings.'" According to the majority, since the amendment re-
quires a permit applicant to demonstrate a viable plan which will re-
duce any impact on listed species, "Congress had in mind foreseeable
rather than merely accidental effects on listed species.""' Justice
Stevens denounced respondents' construction of harm, which would
require "an 'incidental' take permit to avert... liability for direct, delib-
erate action," concluding that unintentional harm beyond the scope of a
section 10 permit brought about by destruction of critical habitat violat-
ed the Act."'
The majority then focused its attention on the court of appeals' at-
tempt to ascribe "a direct application of force" to harm since the other
terms defining "takings" possessed such meaning, but found fault with
this reasoning on three grounds."' Justice Stevens pointed out that
one could "'harass,' 'pursue,' 'wound,' and 'kill'" without use of "direct
applications of force.""13 Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals'
interpretation, knowledge of a section 9 taking is sufficient to violate
the Act, whether such taking is intentional or not."4 Finally, Justice
Stevens took issue with the lower court's use of the doctrine of nosci-
tur a sociis, the practice that a word "'gathers meaning from the words
facial challenge because to accept such a position would "ask us to invalidate the
Secretary's understanding of 'harm' in every circumstance, even when an actor knows
that an activity, such as draining a pond, would actually result in the extinction of a
listed species by destroying its habitat" Id.
109. Id. at 2414. Under § 10 as amended, the Secretary may grant permits for tak-
ings outlawed by § 9(a)(1)(b) "'if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose
of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.'" Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994)).
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id. Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justice Scala's construction of harm,
which would require actual force used against the animal. Id. at 2414-15 n.15; see id.
at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Under the dissent's interpretation of the Act, a devel-
oper could drain a pond, knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered spe-
cies of turtles, without even proposing a conservation plan or applying for a permit
under § 9(a)(1)(B) . . . ." Id. at 2414-15 n.15; see id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
If such an action were undertaken with no harm intended at the endangered species,
it would not be a violation under the dissent's interpretation, a result which the ma-
jority rejecte Id. at 2414-15 n.15; see id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 2415.
114. Id.
around it.'""5 Under the court of appeals' application of the doctrine,
the meaning of harm would be merely duplicative of the other words
used to define "take," whereas the meaning ascribed to harm by the
Secretary more accurately allows the word "'a character of its own not
to be submerged by its association.'""'
Justice Stevens dispensed with respondents' final contention that the
government was enforcing the section 9 prohibition against takings in
an attempt to circumvent its duty to acquire critical habitat under sec-
tion 5 as a means of protecting listed species."7 Noting that acquisi-
tion of land would probably be more economically efficient than en-
gaging in costly litigation, Justice Stevens also rejected respondents'
argument on the ground that action taken under section 9 required an
actual taking to occur."' The Secretary could acquire land under sec-
tion 5 prior to any adverse impact on endangered species habitating
there."' Highlighting the areas in which sections 5, 7, and 9 overlap
and the areas in which they differ, Justice Stevens concluded that
"[a]ny overlap... simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act." 20
Relying on its conclusion of reasonableness of the Secretary's inter-
pretation of harm under the second prong of the Chevron test,"2' Jus-
tice Stevens dispensed with any need to address the first prong and
turned his attention to the legislative history accompanying the Act to
support the Court's decision."22 Pointing to both the Committee Re-
ports and the Senate Reports pertaining to the legislative proposals,
Justice Stevens noted a clear intent on Congress's behalf that "take" be
construed "broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions." "
Additionally, because the Senate amended the proposed legislation spe-
115. Id, (quoting Jarecid v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
116. Id. (quoting Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923)).
117. Id. Under § 5, the Secretary is granted authority to purchase lands on which
survival of an endangered or threatened species depends. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2)
(1994).
118. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2415-16.
121. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the Chevron two-prong
test).
122. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2416.
123. Id.; see S. REP. No. 9307, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995; H.R. REP. No. 9412, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973) (stating
"take" includes "harassment, whether intentional or not"). Justice Stevens focused on
a comment in the House Report which indicated that bird-watching could be prohibit-
ed if it interfered with the birds' reproductive activities as evidence that "the term
'take' . . . reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters and trappers," and
noted that "the dissent's welcome but selective foray into legislative history" did not
address such evidence. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416; see H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973).
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cifically to add "harm" to the definition of "take," the majority conclud-
ed that such a revision "deserve[d] a respectful reading."24 Justice
Stevens then minimized the importance of the deleted "'destruction,
modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range' of fish and wild-
life" language from the original definition proposed on the Senate floor,
since the regulation as embodied at that time was much broader than
the regulation as it was enacted."2
Finally, Justice Stevens found additional support for upholding the
Secretary's interpretation of harm in the 1982 amendments to the Act,
which authorized the Secretary to issue the incidental taking permits
under section 10.26 The majority again repudiated respondents' posi-
tion that the section 10 permit was limited to accidental killings of
listed species by citing legislative history which considered foreseeable,
yet incidental, takings.27 Stating that "Congress had habitat modifica-
tion directly in mind," Justice Stevens reconciled! the 1982 amendment
excepting incidental takings where allowed by permit with the meaning
ascribed to "harm" by the Secretary."
124. Sweet Home, 115 S. CL at 2416-17. The fact that the term "harm" was added
without discussion on the floor, in the majority's view, did not give merit to
respondents' argument that it should thus be construed narrowly. Id.
125. Id. at 2417. Whereas the Act limits takings to "habitat modifications that actu-
ally kill or injure wildlife," Senate Bill 1983 would have related more expansively to
any alteration of critical habitat, whether it resulted in takings or not. Id. Justice
Stevens again dismissed respondents' position that § 5 limited the Secretary's means
for protecting critical habitat to acquisition of lands vital to an endangered species'
existence, noting that floor statements upon which respondents relied for support of
this contention did not indicate that land acquisition was an "exclusive remedy." Id.
at 2417 n.19; see 119 CONG. REC. 25,669 (1973) ("The Secretary would be empowered
to use the land acquisition authority granted to him in certain existing legislation to
acquire land for the use of the endangered species programs.") (statement of Sen.
Tunney); 119 CONG. REc. 30,162 (1973) ("[The principal threat to animals stems from
destruction of their habitat ... H.R. 37 will meet this problem by providing funds
for acquisition of critical habitat . . .") (statement of Rep. Sullivan).
126. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2417; see 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994); supra
note 109 (discussing § 10 permits).
127. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2417-18. "The House Report expressly states that
'[b]y use of the word "incidental" the Committee intends to cover situations in which
it is kmown that a taking will occur if the other activity is engaged in but such tak-
ing is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity.'" Id. at 2417 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807,
2831).
128. Id. at 2418.
In concluding the majority opinion, Justice Stevens stressed the
Secretary's authority to interpret the intricate and detailed complexities
of the Endangered Species Act, noting that "[w]hen Congress has en-
trusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant
to substitute our views of wise policy for his."'" Thus, in light of the
deference accorded to agency interpretations, and having conducted an
extensive analysis of the Act and its legislative history, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals, finding "the Secretary reasonably
construed the intent of Congress when he defined 'harm' to include
'significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or
injures wildlife. '""l
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor based her support of the
Court's decision upon two restrictions in the regulation: application of
the regulation to "actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative,
death or injury to identifiable protected animals," and the doctrine of
proximate cause.'3' Justice O'Connor used Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion as a sounding board against which she discussed her belief that
the Secretary's definition of harm is restricted to actions which result in
death or injury to particular animals."n Justice O'Connor took issue
with Justice Scalia's finding that "[i]mpairment of breeding does not
'injure' living creatures,"" arguing that preventing a species from re-
producing injures the particular animal by "render[ing] that animal...
biologically obsolete."" Justice O'Connor further noted that behavior
patterns necessary for the survival of the species that are circumvented
by alteration of a critical habitat result in the prohibited harm under the
Act." Justice O'Connor thus accepted the application of "harm" to
situations where alteration of critical habitat prevents a listed species
from engaging in activities vital to survival such as "breeding, feeding,
and sheltering. " "
129. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing
the Chevron doctrine).
130. Sweet Home, 115 S. CL at 2418; see 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) (defining harm to
include an act which "may include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential and be-
havioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering").
131. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)).
134. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice
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Justice O'Connor failed to see any discrepancy between the
Secretary's ascribed meaning of "harm" and the legislative history ac-
companying the 1981 amendment to the Act which codified the "actual
death or injury requirement."'37 Whereas Justice Scalia chose to em-
phasize the word "direct" in the Fish and Wildlife Service's statement
that harm could occur beyond "direct physical injury to an individual
member of the wildlife species," Justice O'Connor concluded that one
could similarly attach significance to the term "individual" and deter-
mine that harm is restricted to particularized, listed animals." Justice
O'Connor also noted that the corresponding legislative history required
more than hypothetical harm, indicating that the purpose of adding the
term "actually" was "to bulwark the need for proven injury to a species
due to a party's actions. " "
Justice O'Connor rejected the dissent's position that the doctrine of
proximate cause would not be applied to the Secretary's application of
the regulation when considered with the liability provision of the
Act.4 ° Rather, in light of the deliberate inclusion of the term "actually"
in the regulation, Justice O'Connor concluded that application of the
doctrine was clearly intended.' Noting the intricacies of proximate
cause and indicating that the lower courts should apply a fact-specific,
case-by-case analysis to determine whether causation existed, Justice
O'Connor nevertheless argued that the regulation did raise issues of
duty and foreseeability"'
In concluding her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that
while proximate cause was a component part of the "harm" regulation,
Scala's interpretation of the Secretary's meaning of harm to include "nonexistent
animals," finding the "essential behaviors" of breeding, feeding, and sheltering to be
within the scope of the Act Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
138. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 46 Fed. Reg.
54,748-49 (1981)).
139. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (1981)). Thus, Justice
O'Connor explained that where a tree is felled and consequently no longer is avail-
able as a food source or place of habitat, such action fails to meet the "demonstra-
ble effect.., on actual individual members of the protected species." Id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see 16 U.S.C. § 1540(1) (1994) (imposing
civil liability for knowing violations of the Act).
141. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a detailed analysis of the elements of prox-
imate cause, see Palsgraf v. Long Island R.P, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (requiring
plaintiff to be in the foreseeable zone of danger before a duty arises).
the doctrine had not been appropriately applied in the Pa/ila II deci-
sion.'" According to Justice O'Connor, the consumption of a rare
plant upon which the endangered Palila bird might have depended for
food and shelter "did not proximately cause actual death or injury to
identifiable birds; it merely prevented the regeneration of forest land
not currently inhabited by actual birds."'" Yet in light of the proce-
dural posture of Sweet Home, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
regulation did not exceed the Secretary's scope of authority, and what
she deemed to be an erroneous decision in Pa/ila II could not alter
that.'45 Thus, while noting that both Congress and the Secretary may
take action to alter the regulation, Justice O'Connor justified her alli-
ance with the majority decision.48
C. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
In a lengthy and somewhat stinging dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, initially focused on the
text of the ESA in concluding that a regulation which allows for inci-
dental hunting and killing is an improper interpretation.'47 Justice
Scalia highlighted three factors of the regulation which he believed
rendered it invalid.'" First, the dissent interpreted the regulation as
imposing unlimited liability for any activity which interferes with "'es-
sential behavioral patterns'" of an endangered species, whether such
effects were anticipated or not.' Second, under the regulation a vio-
lation of ESA could occur as a result of an omission rather than an
affirmative action.5" Third, and most significantly, the dissent object-
ed to application of the regulation in situations where injury occurred
to entire populations of an endangered species as opposed to specific,
individual animals.''
In addressing these three points, the dissent viewed the majority's
complete absorption with the term "harm" as erroneous in that the
143. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct at 2421 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 2420-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2421 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was prophetic in recognizing
that Congress would possibly "see fit to revisit the issue." Id. (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Sweet Home, numerous
bills have been introduced into the House and Senate, largely in attempts to scale
back the protections afforded by the Act. See itfra note 202 for a discussion of
-these bills.
147. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id, at 2421-22 (Scaa, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court's opinion failed to consider the meaning of "take.""2 While rec-
ognizing that "take" had a broader meaning than the common law appli-
cation, because it included attempted takings and acts which are in fur-
therance of a taking rather than merely a completed taking, the dissent
maintained that focusing only on the definition of "take" rather than the
word's own independent meaning was a "fallacy... which the Court
comnit[ted] with abandon.""5 The dissent objected to the interpreta-
tion of the word "harm" offered by the majority, finding it "repugnant to
its ordinary and traditional sense," especially when taken in context
with the other terms used to define "take" in the Act."M Noting that
the other nine words in the definition of "take" ("harass, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect"). 5 require direct force
against some individual animal, under application of the canon noscitur
a sociis, the dissent argued that harm should therefore be interpreted
as applying to "affirmative conduct intentionally directed against a par-
ticular animal or animals." " The dissent also took issue with the
152. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalla indicated that if an action was brought
under the 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) definition of "harm," such suit "would be dismissed as
defective, for the only operative term in the statute is to 'take.'" Id. (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
153. Id. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia pointed to statutory and com-
mon law authority to demonstrate that "take" is intended to refer to direct acts pur-
posefully carried out against specific, individual members of an endangered species.
Id, at 2422-23 (Scala, J., dissenting).
154. Id at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority's definition would allow for
omissions rather than direct acts, whereas Justice Scalia felt a more narrow construc-
tion of the word, which required direct acts, was a "more common and preferred
usage." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1994)).
156. Id. at 2423-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the doctrine of nosci-
tur a sociis, see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. See generally Beecham
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1669, 1671 (1994) (stating that "several items in a list
[that] share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possess-
ing that attribute as well"). Justice Scalia also highlighted the following statement
from the Solicitor of the Fish and Wildlife Service in support of his contention that
the Secretary had made a "ruthless dilatation" of harm:
"The Act's definition of 'take' contains a list of actions that illustrate the in-
tended scope of the term .... With the possible exception of 'harm,' these
terms all represent forms of conduct that are directed against and likely to
injure or kill individual wildlife. Under the principle of statutory construc-
tion, ejusdem generis ... the term 'harm' should be interpreted to include
only those actions that are directed against, and likely to injure or kill, indi-
vidual wildlife."
Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490,
Court's premise that application of the doctrine is incorrect when done
in a manner which obliterates any "independent meaning" of the term
itself, noting that if such were the case, the Court should therefore be
required to interpret "trap" to also retain its secondary meaning "to
clothe."'57
As additional support for its interpretation of harm, the dissent
looked to the liability provisions of the Act." Justice Scalia noted
that under § 1538(a)(1)(B), both criminal and civil penalties could be
assessed for a knowing violation, while under § 1540(a)(1) and (b)(1),
only civil penalties could be assessed for unknowing violations." As
the dissenting Justices applied the Secretary's interpretation of harm,
daily activities normally engaged in as part of "farming,... ranching,
roadbuilding, construction and logging" would be subject to the stricter
liability provision even though the acts were not directed at individual
members of a species and thus were committed "unknowingly. " "a The
dissent rejected this analysis, demonstrating that one could unknowing-
ly yet purposefully "take" a member of a listed species by shooting a
protected elk with the belief that it was an unprotected mule deer. '
Where such an unknowing act would be penalized under the stricter
provision, the dissent reasoned that the "more severe penalties provided
for a 'knowing' violation" would be "superfluous." "
The dissent then compared the contextual relationship of "take" as
defined in § 1532(19) with the remaining portions of the Act." Citing
various sections of the Act which refer to "takings," the dissent noted
that none included any reference to habitat modification, and thus the
Secretary's interpretation of "harm" was not consistent with the entire
Act and could not be upheld."6 Furthermore, the dissent argued that
because § 1536(a)(2), pertaining to federal agencies, contained an ex-
29,492 (1981)).
157. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2424-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2424 (Scaia, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2424-25 (Scaia, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2424 (Scala, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2425-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2425 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct.
1061, 1066-67 (1995) ("[T]he Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent meaning
throughout.")). For example, Justice Scalia suggested that if "taidng" were to be inter-
preted in a broader sense than its common law meaning, then the list requiring loss
of "[a]U guns, traps, nets, and other equipment . . . used to aid the taldng" of endan-
gered species under § 1540(e)(4)(B) would have included "plows, bulldozers, and
backhoes" as evidence that Congress intended for habitat modification to be part of a
taidng. Id. (Scala, J., dissenting).
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press prohibition against "destruction or adverse modification" of criti-
cal habitat, while § 1538(a)(1)(B), which applies to individuals and fed-
eral agencies, lacked any similar environmental conservation provision,
under general rules of statutory interpretation the prohibition of the
former could not be implied in the latter.'" Noting, however, that
§ 1536(a)(2) and § 1538(a)(1)(B) both apply to federal agencies, the
dissent found that application of the Secretary's "harm" regulation un-
der § 1538 would overlap the Act's own critical habitat definition in
§ 1536, thus violating another rule of statutory interpretation which
requires each provision to have its own unique meaning." The dissent
rejected the contention that the sections did not overlap because criti-
cal habitat could also refer to land not currently occupied by listed spe-
cies, thus allowing for agency action which altered such terrain, and
instead suggested that such a reading merely reduced the overlap to
areas already occupied by listed species."7
The dissent then dispensed with the majority's four other argu-
ments." First, the dissent regarded the Court's reliance on the "broad
purpose" of the ESA as oversimplified and inaccurate when compared
with what the dissent considered a more appropriate approach using
the tool of legislative interpretation based upon the text of the stat-
ute. 1
Second, noting his own disdain for legislative history as an interpre-
tive tool, Justice Scalia nevertheless addressed the issue in order to
contradict the Court's findings.7 ° The dissent concluded that the
Court gave too much weight to the Senate's addition of the word
"harm" to the definition of "take," while placing too little emphasis on
165. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035,
2040 (1993) ("'[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention-
ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'") (quoting Russelo v. Unit-
ed States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). Justice Scalia noted that "it would be passing
strange for Congress carefully to define 'critical habitat' as used [in one section), but
leave it to the Secretary to evaluate, willy-nilly, impermissible 'habitat modification'
(under the guise of 'harm') in [another section]." Id at 2425-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2426-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia referred to the Court's ap-
proach as a "vice" for "simplistically... assum[ing] that whatever furthers the
statute's primary objective must be the law." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Rodri-
guez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam)).
170. Id. at 2426-27 (Scalia J., dissenting).
the eradication of the habitat modification provision from its defini-
tion.17 In the dissent's view, the legislative history expressly indicated
that habitat modification and takings were completely separate con-
cepts provided for in their own respective sections of the Act, and thus
were not intended to be combined via a regulation which considered
alteration of critical habitat to inflict harm upon listed species."
The dissent disagreed with the Court's premise that the 1982 amend-
ment that allowed for incidental takings under a section 10 permit sup-
ported the Secretary's interpretation of "harm."" While recognizing
that legislative history contained in both the Senate Committee Report
and House Conference Committee Report indicates that the amendment
would "enable the Secretary to permit environmental modification," the
dissent maintained that the amendment did not support the Secretary's
interpretation of harm because habitat modification was not the exclu-
sive incidental taking to which the permit would apply.'74 Thus, be-
cause incidental takings could occur in any number of "otherwise law-
ful activit[ies]," such as "when fishing for unprotected salmon also
takes an endangered species of salmon," the Court's argument that
Congress intended indirect takings through habitat modification to be a
violation was a convenient but ill-founded rationale. 5
Finally, the dissent found fault with the Court's decision regarding
the procedural posture of the case.' 6 The dissent stated that the
Court had "eviscerat[ed]" the doctrine of facial challenge by intimating
that respondents' challenge must fail regardless of whether the
Secretary's interpretation of harm included an element required for lia-
bility under the Act, as long as the interpretation could be applied to a
fact pattern containing the element.'77
171. Id. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying
text (discussing the legislative history accompanying these decisions to add the term
harm and delete references to habitat modification).
172. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited
statements by Senator Tunney and Representative Sullivan as evidence that while the
authority to purchase land under § 5 of the Act would not be the exclusive remedy
for habitat modification, it was intended that "habitat destruction on private lands
[was] to be remedied by public acquisition, and not by making particular unlucky
landowners" bear the burden alone. Id. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982);
see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-32 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2871-73.
175. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). To illustrate, the dissent proposed a hypothetical
situation where a regulation which proscribes murder, but makes no reference to
premeditation, is promulgated to accompany a statute prohibiting premeditated mur-
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The last portion of Justice Scalia's dissent countered two arguments
the Court put forth in response to issues raised in the dissenting opin-
ion. 9' First, in Justice Scalia's view, the Secretary's regulation was in-
valid because it did not meet the proximate cause requirement embod-
ied in the statute.'" The dissent objected to the Court's insistence that
the regulation did include a proximate cause limitation because it did
not specifically reject the limitation'" and stated that the majority re-
futed its own argument when it held that the Secretary's interpretation
of harm properly included indirect injury. 8 Justice Scalia also dis-
missed the majority and concurring opinions' reliance on the inclusion
of the term "actually" in the regulation as instilling an element of proxi-
mate cause, noting that "'actually' define[d] the requisite injury, not the
requisite causality.""s
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's acknowledgment that
the Act did not prohibit injury to an entire population of a listed spe-
cies as opposed to a particular member of the species was not consis-
tent with upholding the regulation because the Secretary's interpreta-
tion included "impairment of 'breeding' as one of the modes of 'kill[ing]
or injur[ing] wildlife.'"'" In Justice Scalia's view, the Court essentially
der. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, a facial challenge of such
a regulation should succeed because the regulation did not require the necessary
element of mens rea, even though the regulation could apply in those killings where
premeditation was present. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2429-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to majority opinion and concurring opinion
at 2412 n.9 and 2414 n.13 respectively).
181. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited to Black's Law Dictionary and
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language as support for his
contention that an indirect cause by its very nature could not also be a proximate
cause. Id. at 2429-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2430 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While courts may uphold a regulation on the
grounds of "reasonable agency interpretations," Justice Scalia cautioned that a court's
duty stops short of "policymaking," and thus courts could not uphold a regulation by
adding a reasonable element clearly not present in the regulation. Id. (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); see supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the Chieuron two-prong
test).
183. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2430 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia made
much of Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which proposed that species are injured
when they are not allowed to reproduce, noting that the only such harm which could
result from this interference would be "psychic harm . . . (assuming of course, that
the animal in question, perhaps an endangered species of slug, is capable of such
painful sentiments)." Id. .at 2430 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If such harm were to be
created its own statute and its own regulation, "law a la carte.""M
Therefore Justice Scalia could not accept the holding that habitat modi-
fication was a "tadng.' "I Instead, returning again to what he per-
ceived as the unambiguous text of the Act, Justice Scalia found that
"only action directed at living animals constitutes a 'take.'"'"
V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court could have relied solely on application of the
two-prong Chevron test to determine that the Secretary's regulation was
a reasonable interpretation of Congress's intent in its decision to up-
hold the definition of harm's inclusion of critical habitat modifica-
tion.' 7 Instead, the Court devoted a considerable amount of attention
to legislative history as additional support for its decision.'" The im-
plications which can be derived from this decision are twofold, and
significantly divergent.
A. Judicial Support of ESA
One possible reason the Court went out of its way to validate its
decision was to signal the lower courts that its precedent of endorsing
the broad purpose of the Act was to continue.'89 Failure to protect the
critical habitat denies endangered species the opportunity to survive or
be restored to an unendangered status."9 The Federal Register cites
encompassed by the regulation, Justice Scalia suggested that a logical corollary would
be the prohibition of "psychic harm of not being able to frolic about-so that the
draining of a pond used for an endangered animal's recreation, but in no way essen-
tial to its survival, would be prohibited by the Act." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. Id at 2430-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id, at 2431 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (instructing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretation of
statute where Congress's intent is ambiguous); see supra note 96 and accompanying
text (discussing the Chevron doctrine).
188. See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416-18.
189. The seminal Supreme Court case recognizing the high significance Congress
placed on conservation of endangered species via the Act is Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding near-completed dam could not be finished be-
cause operation of the dam would harm the endangered snail darter); see supra
notes 24-34 and accompanying text (discussing TVA).
190. See generaUy Kristen M. Fletcher, Conserving Their Kingdom: Habitat Modifi-
cation as a Harm Under the Endangered Species Act, 21 J. LEGIS. 133 (1995) (urging
the legislature to reauthorize ESA to expressly include habitat modification in the
definition of "take" and thus address the pivotal relationship between loss of habitat
and preservation of species). Section 2 of the ESA, which contains the goals, states
"[t]he purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
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destruction of critical habitat as the main threat against endangered
species. 9' The Act contains express provisions for critical habitat con-
servation in two separate sections."n By finding the Secretary's defini-
tion of harm permissible, alteration of critical habitat becomes a prohib-
ited "taking" under section 9, thus extending liability to individuals,
corporations, and government entities."w The Court's holding effec-
tively embraces the course it adopted in TVA, where it declined to con-
sider any economical ramifications of its decision and instead noted
that "the balance ha[d] been struck [by Congress] in favor of affording
endangered species the highest of priorities.""9 Thus, despite the bur-
den the regulation places on the private laidowner,'95 the Court fol-
lowed its own precedent and merely ruled on the reasonableness of the
interpretation of the statute." Lower courts have since followed the
Supreme Court's lead, citing Sweet Home as support for decisions
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved." 16
U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
191. See Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 9, 9-10 (Summer 1995).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1)-(2) (1994). Section 5 authorizes the Secretary to engage
in the acquisition of land to facilitate the conservation of endangered or threatened
species. The jeopardy provision contained in § 7 prohibits federal agency action "like-
ly to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such
species." Id. § 1536(a)(2).
193. See id § 1538. Section 3 defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct" Id. § 1532(19). The regulation promulgated by the Secretary through the
Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service is as follows: "Harm in the definition of
'take' in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or in-
jures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breed-
ing, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
194. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
195. See generally Jane Kay, On a Mission: Property-Rights Advocate Finds Con-
gress Niche, Cm. TB., Nov. 18, 1995, at 17 (discussing bill proposed by Con-
gressmen Richard Pombo and Don Young to reauthorize the Endangered Species Act
and specifically remove habitat destruction from the definition of harm); Nancie G.
Marzulla, Endangered Breed: Those Who Own Land, AUSTIN Am.-STATESMAN, Nov. 22,
1995, at A9 (examining the impact the Endangered Species Act has on private proper-
ty owners and arguing that unless the Act is revised, landowners themselves will
become extinct).
196. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct.
2407, 2412-14 (1995).
which prohibit habitat modification as a violation of the taking provi-
sion of section 9 of the ESA-
097
B. Congressional Reauthorization
Another possible reason the Court relied so heavily on legislative
history as one of the grounds for its decision was to send a clear mes-
sage to Congress that policy making is in the hands of Congress, not
the Court, and only a substantial change in the Act itself could result in
a different outcome." Justice O'Connor hinted as much in her con-
currence when she stated "Congress may, of course, see fit to revisit
this issue."'" Congress has not hesitated in the past to take action re-
garding the Act when disgruntled by a Supreme Court ruling: After com-
pletion of the Tellico dam was halted by the TVA decision, Congress
(which had previously appropriated more that $100 million to build the
dam) amended section 7 of the Act to allow for exemptions from the
jeopardy provision." When an exemption to complete the dam was
197. See Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla 1995)
(granting an injunction against vehicles traveling the beach at nighttime because they
posed various risks to both hatchlings attempting to reach the ocean and to the adult
females who come ashore to lay eggs); Earth Island Inst v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp.
616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (prohibiting importation of shrimp caught with commercial
fishing technology that results in incidental talings of four species of endangered sea
turtles). But see Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that
prohibition of snowmobiling on lakeshore was not warranted because the agency's
finding that snowmobiling on lakeshore resulted in incidental tadng of endangered
wolves and bald eagles was merely speculative) (citing Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at
2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating the Act and its corresponding regulation re-
quire more than "speculative or conjectural effects")).
198. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 866 (1984) ("The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices
and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not
judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.'")
(quoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 195); TVA, 437 U.S. at 194 ("[lit is ... emphatically-the
exclusive province of the Congress . . . to formulate legislative policies. . . ."). See
generally Richard Stone, Court Upholds Need to Protect Habitat, SCIENCE, July 7,
1995, at 23 ("This is a call to arms for Congress to scrap the current ESA and write
a law that works.").
199. See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally
Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R
2275 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement
of W. Henson Moore, President and CEO, American Forest & Paper Ass'n) (noting in
his testimony in support of the bill that Justice O'Connor's concurrence "invited Con-
gress to revisit this issue").
200. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (1994). A federal agency can seek exemption from
the jeopardy provision which proscribes agency actions that threaten the existence of
a listed species or destroy or degrade critical habitat. Id. The Endangered Species
Committee (known informally as the "God Squad") grants the exemption only when
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not granted as expected, Congress ultimately passed a bill mandating
completion of the dam. 1
Similarly, in the wake of Sweet Home, a number of bills have been
proposed in Congress which would effectively eviscerate ESA.' 2 Envi-
there are no other reasonable and prudent alternatives, the agency action is in the
public interest on both a regional and national basis, and the benefits of the pro-
posed action outweigh the benefits of actions that do not jeopardize. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(h)(A)(i)-(iv) (1994). For an in-depth look at the exemption process and the
function of the "God Squad," see John L Weston, Comment, The Endangered Species
Committee and the Northern Spotted Ow" Did the "God Squad" Play God?, 7 ADMIN.
LJ. AM. U. 779 (Fall 1993-Winter 1994); Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Pro-
cess Under The Endangered Species Act: How The "God Squad" Works and Why, 66
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (1991).
201. See Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1979, Pub. L No. 96-
69, 93 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1979)).
202. See HIR 2364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (bill proposing removal of punitive
regulations from the Act) (introduced by Rep. John Shadegg (R-Ariz.)); S. 1364, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (balancing the need to protect endangered species with need
to protect rights of private property owners and requiring compensation for owners
whose property is devalued by ESA) (introduced by Sen. Dirk Kempthorne (R-Idaho));
S. 768, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (addressing the problem property owners face
when their land is designated critical habitat under the Act) (proposed by Sen. Slade
Gorton (R-Wash.)); H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (requiring that social and
economical consequences of enforcing the Act be taken into consideration and man-
dating compensation for landowners whose property declines more than 2096 in value
as a result of the Act) (proposed by Reps. Don Young (R-Ala.) and Richard Pombo
(R-Cal.)); H.R. 2374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (implementing an advisory panel
chosen by the Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of Commerce which would con-
duct a cost-benefit analysis to determine if measures should be taken to conserve an
endangered species) (proposed by Rep. Wayne Gilchrest (R-Md.)); see also S. 1459,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (redesignating land previously controlled by the Bureau
of Land Management and United States Forest Service into the control of a small
number of graziers and exempting permit holders who claim economic distress from
controls designed to eliminate resource damage) (proposed by. Sen. Pete Domenici (R-
Ariz.)); S. 22, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (expanding the meaning of private proper-
ty to encompass acts done in pursuit of malting a profit from the property, and pro-
viding for compensation when protection afforded under various federal provisions
diminishes the fair market value of the property) (introduced by Sen. Bob Dole (R-
Kan.)). See generally Alexander Cockburn, A Bait-and-Switch Battle Over Endangered
Species, SEATTLE TiMEs, Nov. 23, 1995, at B13 (articulating the premise that while
various legislation is being promulgated on the hill, the ESA has already been gutted
by administrative decrees which drastically impact numerous endangered species); Jim
Nichols, The Remaking of Environmental Law: Cost, Property Rights Emerge as
Issues; Change Brewing on Environmental Law, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.), Nov. 29, 1995,
at IA (summarizing common themes running through the numerous bills proposing
environmental reform).
ronmental reform proposals range from specifically excluding habitat
modification from the definition of harm,2" to adding economic and
social consequences as a factor to be considered when enforcing the
Act,2" to mandating compensation for landowners who experience di-
minished property values resulting from enforcement of ESA.' De-
spite the wave of proposed legislation which has swept through Con-
gress in the aftermath of the Court's holding, the ESA to date remains
relatively unscathed, and in fact seems to be holding its own.2" Public
opinion polls indicating environmental issues are still a priority with
voters may be the reason behind Congress's failure to implement re-
forms set forth in its Contract With America.2"7 However, whether the
ESA will survive the frontal assault remains to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
The red-cockaded woodpecker and the spotted owl have been grant-
ed a reprieve by the United States Supreme Court. Whether it becomes
a temporary grace period will be determined by Congress. Members of
the legislature, however, should take heed of the strong message con-
tained in the Court's decision. The Endangered Species Act sets the
value of species diversification very high, and courts have interpreted
this value to be "incalculable."2 " Beyond the compelling argument for
conservation for future generations' sake, if one requires an economic
203. H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See generally Endangered Species
Reauthorization, 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2275 Before the House Comm. on Re-
sources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Stuart L Pimm, Professor of
Ecology, Univ. of Tenn.) (implicating the degradation of habitat as the primary force
behind loss of species, and noting "[t]his bill's redefinition of 'harm' thus removes the
most significant cause of extinction from the scope of the Act's prohibitions").
204. S. 1364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 768, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
205. S. 1364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
206. See Timothy Noah, US. Rollback of Green Agenda is Stalled, WALL ST. J., Dec.
27, 1995, at 2 (noting that despite numerous attempts by the Republican Congress to
scale back various environmental statutes, including the Endangered Species Act, no
proposals containing significant environmental reform have been passed).
207. See generally id, at 2 (noting a study which found that while "a 61% majority
believes the EPA does not need to issue more regulations to improve environmental
quality ... a 62% majority of the same respondents said environmental protection
ought to be a bigger priority than cutting the number of regulations"). But see John
Kimak, Endangered Species Act Scrutinized, LV. REv. J., July 8, 1993, at 5D (docu-
menting complaints of the Wildlife Legislative Fund of America, an organization com-
prised of 1.5 million hunters, in regard to the ESA and calling for amendments to
address their concerns).
208. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978) ("[T]he plain
language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress
viewed the value of endangered species as 'incalculable.'").
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rationale, the potentially life-saving drugs which can be developed from
yet-discovered plants and species, and the economic potential such
resources represent, should be an added incentive to protect critical
habitat.'n Without adequate ecosystems in which to feed, breed, and
find shelter, species which are threatened or endangered cannot sur-
vive. Destruction or degradation of habitat critical to a listed species
harms not only the particular animal itself, but it also harms all of hu-
manity, for once extinct, a species is lost forever. Manldnd cannot
afford the loss.
LAURIE M. STONE
209. See, e.g., ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1, at 5-9 (4th ed. 1995) (reprinting G. Ledec & R. Goodland,
Wildiands: Their Protection and Management in Economic Development, 5-15 (1988)
(advocating the importance of biological diversity)).

